Pensions Liabilities Force Layoffs at Chicago Public Schools

Buried beneath the glaring headlines of the debt crisis of Greece and Puerto Rico, lies the under-reported story of the public pension and debt crisis of the Chicago Public School System (or CPS). Facing massive public employee unfunded liabilities and a judicial climate unsupportive of reform, the bonds of CPS, along with those of the City of Chicago were downgraded by Moody's Investors Service to junk bond status this past May. Moody's took the action almost immediately following a landmark decision on public employee pension reform by the Illinois State Supreme Court.

The court struck down a pension reform measure passed by the Illinois legislature in 2014 designed to stem the hemorrhaging of funds to address the state's severely underfunded public employee retirement system. The pension reform plan included provisions to eliminate an annual cost of living adjustment of 3%, while boosting public agency contributions to the system, in an effort to bring the struggling state pension plan to 100% funding in thirty years. 

As to Chicago Public Schools, the Moody's action downgraded $6.2 billion of bonds to junk status. Citing its public employee pension exposure, the rating agency pointed to the stunning growth in CPS' annual pension funding requirements, from $197 million in 2013, to $634 million in 2015.  It is that latest pension payment of $634 million that gave rise to the recent funding crisis for CPS,as the district found itself simply unable to pay. With the deadline for the contribution of June 30 approaching and no extension possible, CPS sought a variety of measures to help it keep from default on its pension contribution.

When the smoke cleared last night, the payment was made, but we now learn at the expense of 1,400 salaried positions at the School District. In reporting on its plan to make payment on its public employee pension obligation, CPS made mention for the first time of its plan to eliminate 1,400 positions in an effort to reduce expenses by $200 million to bring its budget back within its limits. Faced with a sudden and previously unannounced plan to lay off teachers, the President of the Chicago Teachers Union claimed, " Mayor Emmanuel's handpicked board has led this district over a financial cliff."

Unfortunately, this may not be the last time we hear these or similar criticisms of local government in the years ahead. CPS will have a payment of this or larger proportions in 2016, as well.

Oakland, CA and the Public Pension Crisis

When I started out researching the finances of the City of Oakland, I fully expected to end up in a very different place than where this story actually ends. I knew that Oakland was struggling with pension liabilities so I thought by chronicling the effect of growing pensions on the city's finances, I might create a reasonable case study of how public employee pensions are weighing on mid-sized American cities.

If we step back to 2001, the city made contributions to CalPERS, the statewide pension administrator, of $24 million, funding 100% of it annual pension contribution or APC. Its net pension obligation was zero. Pension costs for the city's FPRS closed-end pension plan were funded in 1997 by way of a cash contribution of $22.8 million, and supplemented in that year by the proceeds of a pension obligation bond (POB) of $417 million. As a result, the program was projected to be fully funded through 2011 (although its unfunded pension obligation should be adjusted to include the $417 million of unpaid bonds).  

By 2005, however, an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) appeared in FPFS of $268 million and its funded status had dropped to 69%. At the same time, the city's CalPERS account showed a combined UAAL of its public safety and miscellaneous employees plans totaling $370 million. The city's annual contribution to PERS had grown from $24 million in 2001 to $87.5 million by 2005, an increase of 265% in just four years. Over the same period, the city's general fund revenues had only grown by just 34%.

By 2014, the city's pension liabilities would begin to look downright ominous. The UAAL of FPRS had declined to $230 million, representing the closed-end nature of the plan and the smaller retiree population covered by the plan. Nonetheless, its funding status had fallen to 64%. And the city's combined PERS liability for its safety and miscellaneous plans had now grown to a staggering $1.13 billion, or nearly four times the size of its payroll. It's annual PERS costs had risen to $98 million.

Now, I know what you're thinking. What about the debt service on all the POBs that the city had issued to fund its UAAL. The city issued $417 million of POBs in 1997 to fund a deposit to FPRS and, in 2012, another $212 million to refund, in part, the 1997 bonds. The debt service on these bonds totalled $50 million in 2014. So this number should effectively be added to the $98 million PERS costs mentioned above, producing adjusted annual pension expense for the city of $148 million in 2014.

So this is about where I thought this story would end. The city's annual pension costs had risen from $66 million in 2001 to $148 million in 2014 (inclusive of debt service on POBs), while its unfunded pension liability had grown from $417 million to $1.7 billion (inclusive of POBs). But here's what I didn't expect to find: how well the city administrators and elected officials would address these costs.

Oakland, like many cities in California and across the country, is still struggling to recover from the 2008 recession. For Oakland, property tax revenues lost following the recession did not recover to their 2008 levels until 2013. Today, six years after the recession, Oakland property tax revenues remain just marginally higher than in 2008. Sales tax and state directed motor vehicle license revenues still haven't climbed back to their pre-recession levels. Revenues, overall, are now only modestly higher than their peak. Nearly all of the revenue gain came on the basis of locally enacted taxes for business licenses, utilities, real estate transfer, transit occupancy, parking and franchise taxes.

So here's the unexpected ending to the story. Clearly, Oakland still faces extraordinary unfunded pension liabilities in the face of limited revenue growth, all of which is pressuring its budget and bond credit ratings. But the city has managed to dramatically reduce the size of its budget to live within its means. In fact, its general fund expenses in 2014 were below those of 2008, allowing the city to record an $8.2 million addition to fund balances. The city accomplished this no small feat with the reductions coming largely from general government, allowing the restoring of funds for pubic safety to pre-recessionary levels.

What the future now holds for Oakland and other US cities is predicated on assumptions for economic growth that cannot be known. At thee same time, pension expense will most surely grow, irrespective of revenue growth, as a function of salary increases, enhanced benefits and demographics. Not a pretty picture, yet thus far, the city has done an extraordinary job of containing the damage.

What's Wrong with Social Security and Why it's Important to Gen X and the Millenniums- Part Two

We're all familiar with the payroll taxes that support Social Security, simply by looking at our pay stubs. FICA taxes, or required employee and employer payments under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, provide the foundation of financial support for Social Security. 

The total FICA tax is evenly split between the employer and the employee, with each paying a tax equal to 6.3% of earned wages for a total of 12.6% (as of 2014). The payments are directed to the Internal Revenue Service and then paid into the Social Security Trust Fund (also known as the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust) where they are administered by the Department of Treasury.

For many years, approximately 70, the system worked just fine with annual inflows to the Social Security Trust Fund from taxes and interest, exceeding outflows, in the form of benefits payments to retirees and the expenses of running the system. But in 2013 these lines would begin to cross as the number of program beneficiaries would rise to 62 million, and outflows would exceed inflows. The deficit of the Trust Fund in that year would total $75 billion, a level at which deficits are projected to continue through 2018 (whereafter they are projected to spike sharply upwards).

The problem with all of this is largely the basis of accounting by which the Trust Fund is managed and operated. Unlike defined benefit plans run by corporations and governed under ERISA, no such regulation guides the planning, management and investment of Social Security. Social Security today runs as it always has, as a PAYGO system. Revenue flows in from taxes paid by current workers (and employers) and flows out to retirees and services, each on an annual basis. In effect, we are borrowing from Peter (today's workers) to pay Paul (retirees). Some refer to this as a Ponzi Scheme, although that's perhaps a bit too harsh. Nonetheless, this is essentially how the system functions.

Under ERISA, companies are required to retain actuaries to quantify the present value of future, accrued benefits. They are then required to invest to meet those future liabilities. But this is not at all the way Social Security works. And it's this failure to to do so, that has allowed the Trust Fund to rise and fall with demographics. It's almost as if we knew this day of reckoning would come, when demographics would threaten the solvency of Social Security, but no one ever chose to address it.

Today Social Security reform is the third rail of politics. Everyone knows some level of reform is necessary, but to propose any modification prompts outright ridicule. Yet, with the median retirement savings of 55-64 year olds only $14,000 this generation, like those currently in retirement, will need to receive Social Security benefits just to make ends meet.

If you are interested in reading further about this topic, a full plan for Social Security reform is presented in my new book, "Up in Smoke: How the Retirement Crisis Shattered the American Dream". You can access it here.

CBO 2015 Long Term Budget Outlook

A new report of the Congressional Budget Office was just released. The report projects future budget deficits for the Federal Government through 2040. 

The report highlights future growth in spending on Social Security and health care as two principal drivers in growing deficits. Spending on these two programs alone is expected to grow from its current level of 10.1% of US GDP to 14.2% by 2040.

With current law unchanged, the CBO projects that total federal tax revenue will grow as a percentage of GDP from 17.7% in 2015 to 19.4% by 2040. At the same time, federal spending is projected to grow from 20.5% of GDP in 2015 to 25.3% in 2040. And therein lies the rub. Expenditure growth at rates considerably in excess of that of revenues. I guess you could say the government loses money on every dollar and can't make it up on volume. 

Annual budget deficits are projected to grow from 2.7% of GDP in 2015 to 5.9% by 2040. With growing deficits, the CBO forecasts that total federal debt will exceed 107% of GDP by 2040. Now this raises an important point about how various government agencies and economists measure total US debt and its relationship to GDP. 

According to data of the Federal Reserve Bank, as shown in the chart above, total debt to GDP already exceeds 100%. So why is there a discrepancy in the CBO report? It's a question of whether debt is measured on a gross or net basis. Since a healthy chunk of US Treasury debt is owed to Social Security and other federal programs, like Medicare, this portion of the debt is often netted out, under the theory that "we" owe it to ourselves.

Well, perhaps, but if you are now or are expected to be a recipient of Social Security or Medicare benefits, then it's owed to you. The Social Security Trust Fund is now the world's largest holder of US Treasury obligations, some $2.7 billion of them. The CBO report projects the Trust Fund to become insolvent by 2029. In the CBO's 2008 long term outlook, Social Security was expected to remain solvent until 2050. 

Please see my new book Up in Smoke: How the Retirement Crisis Shattered the American Dream, on Amazon now.

What's Wrong with Social Security and Why it's Important to Gen X and the Millenniums- Part One

The Social Security Administration (SSA) in its 2014 report to Congress, projects the Trust Fund supporting the Social Security System will be insolvent by 2033. The SSA has provided reports like these for many years, with its 2010 report showing a projected date of insolvency of 2040. A 1983 report pointed to a date of 2058. By now, you can see where this is headed.

The Trust fund supporting Social Security is actually referred to as the OASDI fund, and covers both Social Security benefits and also payments under Disability Insurance. With a rapid escalation of disability claims over the past number of years, the disability portion of the Trust Fund is now projected to reach its point of insolvency next year (a date pulled in from 2018 in the 2010 report).

Both programs have seen rapid growth and accelerated outflows since 2008, explained, only in part by demographics and an aging population. Disability has grown dramatically, with roughly ten million people claiming benefits under the program. Its share of the adult population has doubled over the past twenty years, despite advances in medicine and a generally healthier population. Today, the Federal Government spends more on disability payments than on food stamps and welfare combined.

The growth in Social Security claims, as well, can only partially be explained by the aging baby boomer generation. Benefit claims following the financial crisis grew at a rate exceeding forecasts of the Social Security Administration based upon their demographic models. Despite the steep discount to future payments by taking early benefits, this trend has also now been underway for several years.

Many members of Generation X dismiss the whole notion that Social Security will be there for them in their retirement, or that a retirement as most know it, will even be available.  They often fault the baby boomers for the problem, citing over-spending and under-saving as contributing to the retirement crisis. While, in part, this may be true, the problems with Social Security are much more dramatically a problem of mathematics - or demographics, specifically.

In 1940, soon after Social Security began, there were roughly 35 million workers paying into Social Security and only 222,000 beneficiaries (or a ratio of workers to retirees of 159 to one). By 1950, that ratio had fallen to 16 to one, and by 1990, the ratio had declined to three to one. By 2031, it's projected that only two workers will pay into the system for each person collecting benefits.  

All of this, of course, had been forecast by the Social Security Administration many years earlier. But Congress, increasingly focused on their own needs and less and less on the job of actually running the country, largely chose to ignore it. Concerns about an aging population and its impact on Social Security emerged as far back as the early 1980s. Congress then acted to pass HR 1900, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 in an effort to shore up the system. Payroll taxes were raised and benefits, for the first time, became subject to taxation. While they were at it, Congress also thoughtfully moved to add benefit coverage under Social Security to members of Congress, the White House and other executive level appointments. 

But no sooner did surpluses materialize, then Congress found a way to spend the new found cash flow, by borrowing back surpluses of the Social Security Trust Fund, and swapping special issue Treasury Bonds in its place. In fact, this has been the practice for many years. In good years, when Social Security is recording a surplus, the extra cash is borrowed against Treasury bonds. In deficit years, as the Trust has seen for the last several, the shortfall is funded, once again, with Treasury bonds.

It's little wonder then, that the world's largest holder of US Treasury obligations is not China or Japan. It's not even the Federal Reserve. It's the Social Security system. And lest we forget, a Treasury bond is nothing more that a promise to pay from future tax revenue. What that means is that the government will need to raise tax revenue in the future to make good on its promise to pay some $2.8 trillion of obligations to the Social Security system, just for the program to remain on track for insolvency in 2033.

Taper Tantrum Part Deux

Investors may claim to be taking the prospects of a Fed rate increase in stride, but something has clearly triggered the selling of mid to long term Treasury bonds. It was reported yesterday that PIMCO's Total Return Fund, one of the world's largest holders of US Treasuries, unloaded a sizable portion of its stake in Treasuries, lowering their share of the Fund's assets to 8.5% from 23% this past April.

With $107 billion in assets, this would represent selling of roughly $16 billion, hardly enough to move the needle on a $17 trillion market.  En masse, though, with similar moves by other money managers and sovereign investment funds, yields are quickly heading higher. It's unlikely that pension funds and endowments are forming much of the selling, with asset allocation models proscribing certain levels of fixed income allocation. The Fed, while off its campaign of gobbling up a substantial share of new UST issuance, is clearly not a seller either and, in fact, continues to buy each month to replace maturing UST holdings.

Many look to China and Japan, as the largest holders of US Treasury bonds and question their level of buying and selling. The largest holder of US Treasury obligations, however, is actually the Social Security Trust Fund, with roughly $2.8 trillion held (albeit of a special class). Thus, just to meet the targeted date of insolvency of Social Security of 2033, the US Treasury must first raise $2.8 trillion from taxpayers in order to meet the obligation of maturing UST securities. But that's another story.

What's interesting about the recent rise in interest rates is what's happened to the relative value of US Treasury bonds and the sovereign debt of other developed economies. With the UST 10-year trading near 2.50%, its yield represents a whopping 150 basis points over the German BUND, now also rising rapidly in yield. Moreover, UST is trading at higher yields than all EU nations and Japan, save the exception of Portugal, whose bonds yield only slightly higher.

All of this activity, occurs following the first limited bond buying by the ECB begun last March, as part of a 19-month effort to inject $1.2 trillion into the European economy. It's hard to imagine how that plan won't drive yields far lower in months ahead, including those of US Treasuries, now at historic wide spreads to European debt. But in a world where economies are administered by central banks, rather than market based, anomalies like this latest tantrum can and may continue.

NJ Supreme Court Rules on Public Pension Funding

In a surprise move of the New Jersey Supreme Court this morning, the court overruled a lower court decision that required Governor Chris Christie to fully fund deposits to the state pension funds, previously cut by the Governor in his annual budget. Last year, the Governor cut $1.5 billion in funding for pensions from his proposed budget, causing state labor unions to sue for restitution. The unions argued that the Governor was compelled to provide the funding as part of a negotiated settlement with the unions in 2011.

Today's decision reverses the lower court action, with the State Supreme Court ruling that the Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution does not recognize or support a multi-year binding commitment to fund public employee pensions, as so argued by the unions and upheld by the lower court. While this ruling may give the state some interim budget relief, it's pension funding obligations remain daunting.

In 2014, the State provided just under $700 million in cash contributions to its employee pension fund. An additional $2.8 billion was spent on employee health care benefits. The total of roughly $3.5 billion represents more than 10% of state budgeted expenses for the year. Despite this significant investment in shoring up its benefit plans, the state will still underfund its statutory annual funding obligations by nearly $3 billion.

To fully fund its requirement, just to keep pace with current accrued pension costs - and with no effort to catch up on prior underfunding - would require $6.5 billion. The state now faces a $90 billion shortfall in its employee benefits funding - $37 billion in pension costs and $53 billion in unfunded health benefits - three times the size of the state budget.

New GAO Study on Underfunded Retirement Savings

The Government Accounting Office just released a new report on retirement security. Their conclusion: most households approaching retirement have very low savings. Just how low, though, is startling. Among households age 55 and older, one-half have no retirement savings at all in 401(K), IRA or similar defined contribution accounts. Similar findings were reported in a 2013 study of the Federal Reserve Bank, along with the fact that for those age 55 and older that do have retirement accounts, the median balance was just $111,000.

The GAO study, however, also found that 29% of respondents had neither funded retirement accounts nor any employer-sponsored defined benefit plan coverage. Of this group, 41% do not own a home, while an additional 24% own a home with some level of mortgage indebtedness outstanding. For this population, social security, with a median benefit of $15,000 per year, may provide their only means of support in the years ahead. The US Census Bureau estimates that there are currently 40 million Americans aged 65 and older, with this population growing by 10,000 each day. By 2030, an estimated 65 million Americans will have reached retirement age. If 29% are projected to live on a median Social Security income of $15,000 per year (and with Social Security by the Social Security Administration's own projections to become insolvent by 2033) America may soon look like a very different place.

As you might have guessed, the data is no better for younger generations. According to a Harris Poll in 2011, an amazing 32% of the members of Generation X, aged 34-45, reported no personal savings whatsoever. In a recent report of Allianz, 84% of Gen X reports that they see traditional retirement as a romantic fantasy of the past (see post below).

What was most interesting about the GAO report was the distribution of retirement savings among households 55-64. While 41% reported no savings and 20% with savings of less than $50,000, it was the distribution of retirement savings of higher level savers that showed some intriguing patterns. While 9% of the group surveyed showed total savings between $250,000 - $500,000, an additional 9% or an equal number as in the prior group, showed total savings of greater than $500,000. Unfortunately, it's only this latter group, or 9% of those surveyed, that will have much chance of funding a comfortable retirement through 401(k), IRA and similar defined contribution savings plans. The full chart is provided below.

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Generation Worry

Allianz Life Insurance recently reported the results of a study of the views of Generation X toward retirement. What's interesting about their study is that while members of this generation share with Baby Boomers a skeptical and troubled view of their retirement prospects, the percentage so believing is even higher than that of the Baby Boomers. A traditional retirement is now considered a "romantic fantasy of the past", for 84% of those Generation Xers polled by Allianz. More than two-thirds of those surveyed thought that retirement savings targets were "way out of reach" and that they will "never have enough money to retire".

Many young people and even pre-retirees tend to dismiss the grim state of their own retirement funding, believing that they will simply work forever. In fact, expectations of the age of personal retirement are rising, with 37% now indicating they plan to work past age sixty-five, versus just 14% in 1995.  However, while Americans think of age sixty-five as the typical retirement age or that they might work well past this age, in practice, we retire much earlier than this, a full four years earlier on average, with early retirement often brought on by health reasons or layoffs.  

But perhaps of even greater concern for Generation X is that 89% of those polled reported difficulty saving money, while more than half of respondents claimed they "just don't think about putting money away for the future". The most troubling part of the study, however, is that while Gen X is skeptical about their prospects for retirement, 85% also report concerns about the difficulty of keeping a job. Call them Generation Worry.

The truth is, there is still much time for this generation and the millenniums to adjust their lifestyle, spending and savings habits to provide for retirement. While each generation would like to believe this day will never come, as John Lennon so famously said, "Life is what happens when we're busy making other plans". This day will come and with Social Security in desperate shape, corporate pension plans greatly diminished and public employee pension plans suffering startling under-funding, some level of personal planning and public awareness of this issue is well advised.

Our Fixation with Jobs and Employment Data

The most closely watched data point for equity and bond markets continues to be the monthly employment report. Weekly new claims is also closely followed, despite its lack of relevance with the US economy now in its sixth year of expansion. Perhaps markets simply don't know where to look for data. In their suspicion that market gains have been driven largely by Fed policy, stock and bond traders alike have focused on employment as key to the Fed's next move.

The heightened concern clearly has something to do with the lackluster growth in GDP since the recovery officially began in 2009. GDP growth has run plus or minus 2% since 2010, well below its run rate pre financial crisis. Juxtaposed against this backdrop of tepid GDP growth is the anomaly of rapid gains in employment. It doesn’t seem to quite square up. 

Some have pointed to the stubbornly low rate of labor participation and its impact in magnifying the decline in the unemployment rate, pointing to U-6 underemployment, still above 10%, as a more realistic measure of the struggling labor market. But while the quantity of jobs created has had a meaningful impact on lowering the unemployment rate, the quality of job creation may best explain this anomaly.

A report prepared by Global Insight for the US Conference of Mayors found that jobs that had been created over the past five years, on average, paid 23% less than those lost during the 2008-2009 recession. Total wages lost in the move to lower paying jobs were estimated at $93 billion. The same phenomena was observed in the recovery from the 2000-2001 recession, where the annual wage of jobs created in the period following the recession averaged $5,000 or 12% less than those lost in the same sectors in the 2000-2001 recession.

In the 2008-2009 recession, where 8.7 million jobs were lost, the annual wage of jobs lost was $61,637. In the recovery that followed, the average wage of new jobs created averaged $47,171, or $14,500 less than similar jobs held prior to the recession. While the greatest number of jobs were lost in the manufacturing and construction sectors, the highest number of new jobs created were in the relatively low paying industries of food and beverage, health care and social assistance. These workers, though employed, are taking fewer vacations, eating out at restaurants less often and spending less on clothes, health care and other essentials.

If this is in fact what is going on, then the unemployment report, the data release most closely followed by the markets, might be telling us very little about the near term direction of interest rates.

Governor Christie and the Question of Income Inequality

Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey was recently out in front of the media tagging the Federal Reserve and the Obama Administratio with the problem of growing US income inequality. While it is undeniably true that income inequality has widened over the past six years, it's highly unlikely that President Obama supports this trend or that his administration has sought to contribute to it. The case of the Federal Reserve, however, presents an entirely different set of facts.

While the Fed's intentions may have been to drive interest rates lower than any period in US history in an effort to spur borrowing and capital formation, neither of these outcomes have actually occurred. Not by a long shot. But for the Fed to believe that these policies could be continued for seven or more years without creating distortions in the economy, is beyond naive. It borders on irrational. No disrespect to Princeton, but did Bernanke actually teach there?

The Reason Foundation in 2012 found that the Fed's policy of Quantitative Easing was "fundamentally a regressive redistribution program...It is a primary driver of income inequality". Their argument, as true today as when put forward four years ago, is that low interest rates primarily serve the wealthy, thereby driving a greater percentage of income earned in the economy in their direction. We'll explain how, but first some data on what's happened to inequality since the Great Recession.

Global Insight, in a report prepared for the US Conference of Mayors in 2012, found that the share of total income gains over the period 2005 - 2012 captured by the wealthiest 20% of Americans, was in excess of 60%. The lowest 40% received just 5.5% of these gains. The reason for this disparity lies in stock wealth and ownership, a principal beneficiary of Fed policy. According to the Economic Policy Institute, roughly 60% of stock wealth is held by the top 1% of US households. Roughly 80% of stock market gains go to the top 10% of American households.

But stock wealth aside, the savings provided by low mortgage rates, in an environment of tight bank lending standards, has also shifted the benefits of mortgage refinancing to the wealthy, who have the greatest chance of qualifying. Renters, of course, have not benefited at all from lower interest rates, as landlords have not only been unwilling to pass on the benefits of refinancing, but in most markets have raised rents aggressively, as home ownership rates have declined.

Meanwhile, banks, who have been able to borrow at interest rates near zero and have paid less than 1% of interest on consumer deposits for the past six years, have held credit card rates near their all-time high. Data of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in a 2012 report to Congress on trends in bank credit card pricing found that average bank rates had fallen from 14.68% in the period leading up to the recession to just 13.09% by 2011. Borrow at zero, relend at 13%. Nice work if you can get it.

But the Fed is not alone in promoting income inequality. The primary problem with the disappearing middle class is that in an era of outrageous and ever escalating political campaign financing, the middle class is becoming invisible to politicians of both parties. They are neither big pharma, nor organized labor. They are neither oil companies, nor Silicon Valley; not Wall Street, Hollywood or the Trial Lawyers Association. They are invisible, except for purposes of rhetoric. 

Want to solve income inequality in America? Put a couple of hundred million dollars in the hands of an organization lobbying for the benefit of the lower and middle classes in the 2016 elections. Make the middle class matter to Washington.

Up in Smoke to Premier at Book Expo America, Jacob Javitz Center, New York

From the Pottstown Mercury News: the Struggle Between the Governor and Legislature over Public Pensions

Puerto Rico Financial Troubles Deepen

Bloomberg news reported this week that the President of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Senate was headed to Washington to meet with US legislators. The purpose of his visit is to lobby for an amendment to Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, to allow the struggling Island to be covered under the same bankruptcy statute now available to US cities, counties and local districts.  A similar measure adopted by the Commonwealth in June 2014, the Puerto Rico Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, was struck down by US courts as unconstitutional this past February. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has already informed the Island that a Federal bailout is not in the cards. 

With the news of Puerto Rico's approach to Washington breaking, it should be quite evident what the Island's plan is for resolving the debt crisis. The Commonwealth, along with the Teachers' and Judicial Retirement Systems are struggling with $37 billion of unfunded pension liabilities, high debt loads, a sluggish economy, falling tax revenue and a declining population.

For holders of the roughly $72 billion of bonds issued by the Commonwealth, this is a bit more salt in the wound. The struggling protectorate issued $3.5 billion in tax-exempt bonds in March 2014 to help stabilize its finances, constituting the largest municipal junk bond offering in history. The bonds, largely sold to hedge funds and offered at an initial price of 93 now trade around 80, resulting in a loss of 13% to those who purchased at the initial offering price just last year. Paulson & Co is reported to be one of the largest purchasers of the 2014 deal, along with DoubleLine. Commonwealth bonds are also owned by Fir Tree Partners. With the recent decline in prices, yields on Puerto Rico triple tax-exempt bonds are now higher than taxable bonds of Greece and Argentina.  

Revenue of the Island this year is projected to come in at $250 million below prior estimates, with a looming budget gap of nearly $200 million to be resolved by the end of the Commonwealth's fiscal year, this June 30. As a solution to the budget issues, legislators have proposed a $500 million reduction in spending and a hike in the Island's sales tax from its current rate of 7% to 11.5%. In addition, a bond payment of $630 million is due the first day of the new fiscal year, or July 1.  

The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (or PREPA) faces budget and financing challenges of its own. The Island's main energy provider is negotiating with creditors to whittle down its $9 billion of debt and avoid a default on a $416 million bond payment, also due July 1. With no legal remedies available to it and all sides lawyered up, this looks to be heading for a messy and involved litigation.

San Bernardino Circles the Drain

Just released were details of San Bernardino's bankruptcy recovery plan. Referred to more delicately as a "plan of adjustment", the proposal calls for repaying bondholders one-percent of their investment in city bonds, or a penny for every dollar loaned the city. Perhaps encouraged by the City of Stockton, who in its bankruptcy reorganization plan repaid investors 11 cents per dollar, it's nonetheless a punishing outcome for those who invested their savings in municipal bond funds that hold San Bernardino bonds.  

Further reported in the city's plan, are significant reductions to its firefighting forces, in a region well-known for wildfires. The bankruptcy plan also calls for cuts to ambulance services, park maintenance and graffiti removal, while extending a temporary sales tax, approved by voters back in 2006. As if these cuts to services weren't troubling enough, given the drubbing bondholders will take on their investment in San Bernardino bonds, it's hard to see how the city will raise money in the future for needed public projects. Fool me once...

A study of salaries of the 120 highest paid firefighters in San Bernardino reported by Bloomberg shows the top one-third drawing an average salary of $190,000 per year; the next third $166,000. In retirement, as early as age 50, these firefighters may be eligible for annual pensions of up to $171,000 per year, an obligation the city will need to pay for many years to come. This might, in part, explain the types of management decisions that led up to the city's bankruptcy. 

Nevertheless, it has us wondering just what becomes of cities like San Bernardino, Stockton and Detroit. Higher taxes, reduced services and limited public improvements are hardly the building blocks of future growth and economic prosperity. Yet 200,000 residents continue to call San Bernardino their home, raise their families there and seek to enjoy its public amenities. The city has let these residents down, much in the way it now proposes to let down investors who loaned it money to build out its infrastructure. Let's just hope, and against significant odds, that the city's plan of recovery actually works.

Chicago Junk Bonds

Hard to believe it's come to this, but municipal bonds issued by the Second City are now considered junk bonds. Moody's lowered the rating on Chicago's bonds this week to "Ba1", below investment grade. The rating change was prompted by the rating agency's continuing concern with the city's public employee pension liabilities. The unfunded portion of the city's ten public pension funds now totals a daunting $37 billion. Standard & Poor's and Fitch continue to rate the city in the "A" category, however, showing a considerable divergence in views with Moody's on the depth of the city's woes.

The rating change for the city comes on the heels of a recent ruling of the Illinois State Supreme Court, which just last week struck down a pension reform measure championed by Governor Pat Quinn and passed by the Illinois State Legislature in 2013. That ruling, potentially disastrous for the state facing its own massive unfunded pension debt, also has negative implications for Chicago.

The rating change affects over $8 billion of bonds outstanding, with investors holding those bonds seeing their price degrade day by day. General obligation bonds issued by the City of Chicago in 2012 and due in 2033 yielded just 3.75%, or a spread of roughly 100 basis points to high quality municipal bonds. By 2014, however, with concerns already beginning to emerge about the city's pension problems, bonds of the city of equivalent maturity were sold at a yield of 4.87%. The yield represented a spread of 170 basis points to the high quality index.

As of today, those same bonds issued just last year at 4.87% are now trading at a yield of 5.51% or at a spread of 2.81% to the index.  With price moving inversely to yield, this represents a loss of $5.45 per $100 of value (or 5.45%) to investors who purchased the bonds at the offering just last year. If the bond ratings are similarly dropped by S&P and Fitch, the bonds will unquestionably fall much further in value.

Far higher interest rates on new borrowings of the City and the losses suffered by investors in the city's outstanding bonds may be the least of it, however, with interest rate swaps entered into by the city from years earlier posing a vexing problem for the troubled city. The downgrades may permit banks that had entered into interest rates swaps and other derivative products with the city to now demand payment on upwards of $2.2 billion of those agreements. Similar downgrade provisions helped force Jefferson County, Alabama into bankruptcy a few years earlier.

The past few years have seen some of the largest, and most frequent bankruptcy filings of local government in US history. Jefferson County, Alabama, the cities of Vallejo, Stockton, San Bernardino, Central Falls, Harrisburg and Detroit have all filed, largely due to excessive debts and pension liabilities. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with a staggering $73 billion of US municipal debt outstanding now teeters. Chicago, now in junk status, is on deck.

April Employment Report

The April employment report of the Labor Department showed a 223,000 change in non-farm payrolls with the unemployment rate dropping to 5.4%, in line with forecasts. Less noticed perhaps in the report were the significant downward revisions to the March employment report, with jobs being revised down by 40,000 to 85,000 for the month. The bond market has taken the news hard, as if April employment exceeded forecasts and March was revised higher, rather than lower. Go figure.

The fascination, though, with the employment report in both equity and debt markets is slightly puzzling. The theory, of course, is that job creation creates income and spending power to drive consumption and GDP. It would also signal improved confidence of businesses, seeking greater employment. But there's a disconnect between theory and practice, with Q1 GDP significantly below the economy's tepid 2% annual pace and forecasts for Q2, equally as grim.

Nevertheless, it's the unemployment rate, that soundbite of 5.4% that seems to catch the attention of bond traders around the globe. This fascination sustains, despite great controversy surrounding the number itself, and the impact of a stubbornly low labor participation rate upon the calculation. If we are trying to measure the propensity of consumers to, well, consume, perhaps the unemployment rate is not the best measure.

In addition to the unemployment rate, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also publishes a ratio of employment to population. This, to our thinking, might be a better representation of the portion of the population that is both generating income and consuming, versus the portion of the population, like children and the elderly, that primarily consume. The latter two groups, in effect, access financial resources to support their spending from parents, savings and governmental spending, rather than through income generation.

This ratio has been stuck, stubbornly, at 59%, give or take a couple of basis points, since 2009. After falling considerably from its levels in the years preceding the financial crisis, the ratio has failed to recover during the economic recovery that began in 2009. There can be many explanations for this, including the advancing of the Baby Boomers into retirement, a process that itself has been linked to the sluggish recovery, rather than the other way around. It can also be linked to the explosion of student loan borrowing, elevating college and post-college attendance. And lastly, it can be attributed to the soaring rates of disability claims, following the Great Recession.

Whatever the explanation, America needs to find a way to employ a greater share of its population and raise the median wage of that employment if the intent is to once again rely upon the consumer to fuel economic growth. The latter will be a subject of a future post.

Rising Yields on Treasury Bonds

We've seen a startling and unexpected move to higher yields on the UST 10-year over the past two weeks, with yields rising from 1.87% on April 17 to 2.24% on May 6. Market professionals are scratching their heads to understand the backup in rates amidst weak Q1 GDP, durable goods, factory orders and most recently, ADP private payrolls. 

Much of the latest tantrum followed a prescient call by Bill Gross on shorting German BUNDs, for which those investors following his advice would have profited considerably. Soon to follow were prognostications by a variety of equity guys, including Warren Buffet, who while a demonstrated equity maven, might not be the best source of advice on bonds. Warren's a bit like your family doctor, who skilled in medicine seeks to give advice on a range of subjects beyond his expertise.

For his part, Warren is an old school cronie, not unlike John D. Rockefeller or J. P. Morgan, who built fortunes on the intersect of politics and business. But a bond trader, not so much. Equity guys fail to understand how bonds trade or the simple fact that bonds, unlike stocks, have terminal value.  

For those who make their living in the sector, bonds trade on price, not yield. The price reflects the ownership of a stream of future cash flows. As robust economic activity and the prospect of inflation discount the value of those cash flows, bonds diminish in value. Conversely, weak economic growth creates value. In the deflationary world that Bernanke so feared, bonds would scream.

All of which is to say, the weak level of recently reported economic fundamentals argues that the current tantrum may not have legs and, at least in this one instance, an investor might profit by taking the other side of Warren's trade.

Early Social Security Benefits and the Labor Participation Rate

Marketwatch reported today on the percentage of Social Security recipients taking "early" benefits from Social Security. A surprisingly high 73% of recipients or nearly three out of four, now elect to take benefits prior to full retirement age, thereby significantly reducing the benefits that they will receive in retirement.  

Full retirement age for those born between the years 1943-1954 is defined as age 66, with the date gradually increasing.  For those born 1960 or later, 67 becomes the new full retirement age. Social security benefits are available to those retiring earlier than these ages, but at a reduction of 13% for those electing benefits at 65, the age most commonly associated with retirement (reduced benefits are actually available as early as age 62, but at a 30% reduction). For those waiting until age 70 to take social security, benefits increase each year by 8% relative to the full retirement age, up until age 70 when they are capped. The benefit claimed at any of these ages, is then fixed for the duration of the person's retirement.

These changes were put in place as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (HR 1900) when the Trustees of the Social Security Trust Fund first became concerned about the solvency of the Trust relative to future benefit payments. Interestingly, this act also expanded Social Security benefits to members of Congress and the White House and instituted the taxing of benefit payments to recipients. What Congress giveth with one hand, they taketh away with the other.

Most retirement planners advise people to wait as long as possible to claim benefits. But the point of this article is not to advise people on their selection, but rather to examine the social and economic issues that drive behavior. There are several reasons why people might take early, reduced benefits including illness, or because they believe they can invest the funds at a higher rate of return. The most common reason, though, is that they simply need the money. But there is another reason to consider: Social Security benefits are not guaranteed. The Trustees of the Fund can change the level of benefits going forward at any time.

Of these reasons, the fact that people need the money is both the most likely explanation and the most telling of the limp recovery following the financial crisis.  Along with the significant rise in disability claims over the past six years (and the vast expansion of the student loan program) early social security benefits likely explains the last piece of the puzzle in the pronounced and lengthy decline in the labor participation rate.

Rising Rents

There was an interesting article on Business Insider today about the rising cost of rental housing in America. If you rent your home or apartment, or know someone who does, you're well aware of what has happened to rents over the past five years. The article mentions one important factor driving demand, the shift from homeownership to renting following the financial crisis, with 36% of people currently renting versus 31% before the crisis.

This is a very compelling consideration, and raises some important questions about housing policy, the banking sector and the Federal Reserve. What's driving the increased demand for rental housing are several factors, including limited supply and cumbersome local zoning/approval requirements for new development. But also driving rents are the tightened mortgage approval standards of banks for home ownership, following the collapse of the shadow banking market. The shadow banking market (or the market for private label mortgage backed securities) fueled the growth of sub-prime loans, no-doc loans and other inventions of the early 2000s by providing a secondary market for banks to sell these newly originated loans. With this market still largely defunct and in an environment today of weak personal income growth and rising bank lending standards, those seeking new housing are increasingly forced into the rental market.

Now landlords, amidst this growing demand for rental housing are for the large part killing it. They've been able to finance new multi-family or refinance existing developments at historically low interest rates, while enjoying ever escalating rents from tenants. Nice work if you can get it. But this pronounced shift to rental housing once again highlights Fed policy, post recession and it's wealth effect on the average citizen.

Large corporations have been able to reduce borrowing costs dramatically since 2008, now borrowing 10-year debt at interest rates as low as 3.00%.  But small businesses have struggled to access financing for new projects. Owners of homes have been able to refinance their mortgages at generally lower rates, although bank standards have biased approvals to the wealthiest with the best credit in an environment of greater regulation. And let's not forget the wealth effect the Fed has created for the owners of stocks. But bear in mind, as with home refinancing and corporate financing, stocks are very narrowly held (with 80% of stock ownership held by the top 10% of Americans by wealth) thereby shifting this benefits of Fed policy to the wealthiest.

All this raises the very obvious question about who has benefited and who has not from the Fed's six-year policy of zero interest rates and whether it might be time to redress these imbalances that the Fed has created.

Fidelity: 401(k) and IRA Balances Hit Record Highs

Earlier today, CNBC posted a report with the above title on their website.  The article referenced a new report of Fidelity Investments that claimed that 401(k) and IRA balances hit record highs in the first quarter of 2015, with the average balance now standing at $91,800.  Now, the article doesn't exactly identify what constitutes the "average", whether this is intended to be the median balance of accounts at Fidelity or just the simple arithmetic mean.  Either way, it doesn't quite square with other research, including data of the Federal Reserve.

Tracking just how much individuals have saved in IRA and 401k accounts is tricky business, due to the various measures used to report the data.  Many sources, including brokerage firms and mutual fund companies report their data as a simple arithmetic mean: they add up the total balances in all IRA and 401k accounts they manage and divide by the number of people holding those accounts.  Thus, the estimated $102 million that Mitt Romney is believed to hold in his IRA is averaged in with the $15,000 of the average middle class household.  It’s just not a meaningful number.

No slight to Mr. Romney’s contribution to America’s retirement savings, but for the data to be reported in a way that is of any value in understanding the current retirement crisis, the “average” balance needs to be calculated on the basis of the median.  To do this, of course, you simply line up all the account balances at a place like Fidelity from smallest to largest, and find the account in the precise middle by value, with exactly fifty percent of accounts holding greater balances and fifty percent holding lesser.  This would only tell you, of course, what the average balance is of investors who hold accounts at Fidelity (and, therefore, not representative of the average American) but it’s certainly more realistic than reporting an arithmetic mean.

While the median value of retirement assets has risen in recent years, according to recent data of the Federal Reserve Bank the portion of respondents who even owned a retirement account of any sort fell to less than half, continuing a downward trend that began in 2007.  For those who are fortunate enough to have a 401k account, even with recent record gains in stock prices, the median balance of 401k/IRA accounts was just $59,000 at the end of 2013.  At a four percent recommended annual spending rate in retirement, an account of this size would produce (pre-tax) retirement income of less than $200 per month, or less than the average American family spends on groceries each week. 

UST Negative Yields

Sounds crazy, doesn't it? The idea that the US Treasury, or any government could be paid to borrow money is contrary to everything we've learned about finance and the time value of money. Yet, strange as it sounds, there are now 17 countries whose sovereign debt trade at negative yields, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France...well, you get the idea. Even 2-year sovereign debt of the Czech republic traded in negative yields this week.

As of this writing, the German 2-year bond is yielding -0.27%, while the 5-year was at - 0.11%. This means that an investor will accept -0.27% less of his principal investment back each year for the next two years, for the privilege of keeping money parked with the German government . When Swiss yields dropped below zero, everyone rolled their eyes, but reconciled the silliness with the idea that this was Switzerland where wealthy foreign investors, for reasons of safety, have stashed large sums of cash  for generations. Swiss government bond yields are now negative out to ten years.

But yesterday's crossing of Japanese bond yields into negative space, has us really scratching our heads. After all, there as many highly informed, highly educated investors who believe that Japan's fiscal woes are unsolvable, as not. If repayment is in question, then how are investors being compensated for risk?

The question is, what's happened to credit spreads; the idea that each borrower's debt yield "spreads" to some "risk free" rate of interest, based upon credit-worthiness? With US credit ratings previously in question, the risk free rate has more recently shifted to Germany. And with the ECB now buying bonds of european central governments, many of these nations' debts are showing negative yields.

Bill Gross, the legendary bond king came out last week and argued that the German 10-year, currently at 0.16% is the short of a lifetime. Meaning, those investors betting that German yields will rise (and therefore the price will decline) stand to be handsomely rewarded. Far be it for us to disagree with any bond royalty, but in this case maybe not so fast.

What's far more interesting is the credit spread of the 10- UST to German bond, with UST now yielding 1.80% over the Bund (http://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/government-bond-spreads). By the way, if you're looking for something more juicy, take a look at the Brazillian 10-year, now yielding 12.60%. Wasn't it just a few years ago that all the talk was about the BRICs? Now, the Russian 10-year is at 11.20%, India at 7.66% and what did the "C" stand for again?

Getting back to the point. While German 10-year yields may be unsustainable at this level, shorting the Bund is a dangerous proposition. Remember John Maynard Keynes adage, "markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent". The more interesting trade is the US 10-year, now yielding a 25-year high relative to the Bund (ideally, you'd want to short the Bund and go long UST to play this trade, but a simple long position might be worth considering). 

It's also interesting to consider what could cause this credit spread to widen. Negative economic news in the US? While theoretically, bad economic news should widen a spread to the risk free rate, such news would also cause interest rates more generally to decline (due to lower inflation risk) thereby improving the long trade. And good news? This might cause rates to rise, but in a compressed fashion by a tighter spread to the Bund. Thus, the ECB is effectively anchoring the yield of most developed world debt. This all suggests that the most likely scenario is that credit spreads narrow over time, lowering UST yields and boosting prices. Safer to be long the UST 10-year, than short the Bund.

As to the Fed and raising rates, we think the Fed is in a box for quite some time, the subject of a future post.